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BAR BRIEFS
question, and have held that this is a Christian nation, and that
laws enacted to prevent the desecreation of the Sabbath are valid
for that reason, notwithstanding Constitutional provisions similar
to § 4, supra ....
The courts of practically all other states have
sustained such statutes as a legitimate exercise of the police
power, intended to promote the welfare, morals, and sanitary condition of the people." Spalding, J., in State ex rel. Temple v.
Barnes, 22 N. D. 18, 21, 132 N. W. 215, 216, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.)
114, Ann. Cas. 1913 E, 930 (1911).
"People are at liberty to attend the church of their choice or
to continuously remain away from church ....
The legislative
assemly has, however, said that in doing so they must not interfere with the purpose of the day, as viewed in the light of the
history of the times, when our Constitution was framed, and the
purpose of the founders. In fact, it may be maintained that the
only effect of Sunday laws like our own is to secure peace and
quiet in the observance of religious ceremonies and worship of an
overwhelming majority of our people. The fact that they happen
to be adherents of the Christian faith may in no manner affect
the principle. The legislature has reached the conclusion that the
performance of ordinary labor and of certain other acts is an infringment upon the right of a great majority of the people to
worship and to observe the day as set apart for that purpose, and
as a day of rest." Id. 22 N. D. 26, 132 N. W. 218.
(Continued in next issue)
LAW BOOKS
Any member interested in the purchase of Federal Library
American Digest and first 84 Volumes of ALR with digests,
write Win. A. Kunkel, Attorney at Law, at Carrington, N. D.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS

In W. E. LaPlante, Pltf. and Respt. vs Implement Dealers Mutual Fire
Insurance Company. etal.. Deft. and Aplts.
That a pre-trial conference held under the provisions of chapter 216,
S.L.N.D. 1943, is not a special proceeding.
That a pre-trial order made under the provisions of sections 1 and 2
of chapter 216, S.L. N. D. 1943 after conference and before trial is subject
to such modification by the judge presiding at the trial of the -case as
the ends of justice may require.
That a pre-trial order made after conference and before trial under
the provisions of sections 1 and 2, chapter 216, S.L. 1943, is not appealable
order.
Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County, Holt, J.
APPEAL DISMISSED. Opinion of the Court by Morris, Ch. J.
In Isabel Clark, Pltf. and Applt. vs R. M. Stoudt, Deft. and Respt.
That the duty of keeping the sidewalks of a city free from ice and
snow is upon the municipality itself.
That at common law, neither the owner nor the occupant of premises
abutting on the sidewalk is liable for injuries caused by the natural accumulation of snow or ice -thereon.
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That a city ordinance which requires the occupant of property abutting
on a street to keep the sidewalk in front of his place free from ice and
snow, and which provides a penalty for failure so to do, is merely a
method which the municipality adopts to compel the said occupant to
assist it in performing its municipal duty.
That owners and occupants of property are not liable to a pedestrian
for injuries resulting from a fall caused by slipping on ice and snow
which, due to natural weather conditions, accumulated on the sidewalk
in front of the property, notwithstanding an ordinance penalizing failure
to remove such ice and snow.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Stutsman County,
Jansonius, J. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the court by Burr, J.
In Congress Candy Company, Pltf. and Respt. vs George Farmer, Deft.
and Apit. and B. A. Sell, Game and Applt.
That exemption of property from attachment or execution is a privilege conferred upon the debtor and does not deprive him of any of the
ordinary incidents of ownership of the exempted property, such as the
right to encumber, sell or otherwise dispose of it.
That there are no creditors within the meaning of the statute relating
to fradulent conveyances, so far as exempt property is concerned.
That a party who owns no property other than such as is absolutely
exempt and such as he 'has a right to claim as exempt, commits no fraud
upon creditors by disposing of 'his property.
That the interest of a pledgor in the -property -pledged is entirely
separate and distinct from that of the pledgee; the general title in the
property pledged remains in the pledgor subject to a lien in favor of
the pledgee for the amount of the debt or obligation for which the pledge
is given, and this rule applies, notwithstanding an apparent transfer of
legal title to the pledgee.
That the Bilk Sales Law (Sec. 7224-7227, C.L. 1913) does not apply
to a sale of property which is exempt by law from execution.
That Section 7740, C.L. 1913 which reads: "No property shall be
exempt from execution or attachment in an action brought for its -purchase
price or any part thereof" does not give a seller's lien on the property so
as to bind the property in the hands of one to whom the purchaser may
sell it; nor does it -affect priorities between creditors. It merely permits
the seller to subject prpperty that -has been sold by him to attachment
or execution "in an action brought for its purchase price or any part
thereof."
That a party who claims the benefit of the exception from exemption
prescribed -by section 7740, C.L. 1913, must bring himself clearly within
the terms of such section.
That if a merchant, on purchasing goods intended for sale, mixes them
with others of like nature, so that it no longer can be ascertained from
whom any particular parcel or item was purchased unless the particular
parcels or items are identified, this does not render the whole stock liable
to execution in an action brought by the seller of the goods so intermingled
with other goods in such stock. In order to obtain the benefit of the
exception said section 7740, supra, the seller must point out the specific
items or parcels of property purchased from .him, and for which the purchase price remains unpaid, and separate the same from other like property
in the stock.
That a garnishee may plead as a defense to the garnishment that the
property in his possession is exempt -tothe defendant.
Appeal from the district court of Walsh County, Grimson J. From
a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant and garnishee appeal. REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
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In Anno 0. Schott, Pltf and Respt. vs David Enander and Alice Enander, Defts. and Applts.
That in sending by registered mail notice of expiration of the period
of redemption to the owner of property sold at tax sale under the provisions of Ch. 235, S.L. 1939, the county auditor may rely upon the sources
of information prescribed by the statute in obtaining information as to
the address of the owner.
That the failure of the county auditor to serve notice of expiration of
the -period of redemption upon any party entitled to be served under the
provisions of chapter 235, S. L. 1939 is fatal to the validity of a tax deed
issued to the county pursuant to such notice. Appeal from the District
Court of Mountrail County, Jacobsen, J. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the
court by Morris, Ch. J.
In Inga Starkenberg, Pltf. and Applt. vs N. D. Workmen's Compensation Bureau, Deft. and Respt.
That the relation of employer and employee must exist in order to
render the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation fund liable for compensation benefits. The Fund is not liable for injuries sustained by an independent contractor.
That one who contracts to construct a building for another, in accord
with a stipulated plan, without being subject to the latter's superintendence,
orders, or control in respect of the details of the work; who has absolute
control of the work, may work such hours as he see fit to work, may do
the work himself or employ others to assist, and is to be paid a definite
stipulated sum when the building has been fully completed, is not an employee but is an independent contractor.
That in the instant case, it is held, for reasons stated in the opinion
that a person injured in the construction of a portable granary was an
independent contractor, and hence was not within the scope of the North
Dakota Workmen's Compensation Act.
From a judgment of -the district court of Stutsman County, Jansonius,
J. Plaintiff appeals, AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.
In State of North Dakota, Pltf. and Respt. vs John Gebhard, Deft.
and Aplt.
That the jury is the sole judge of the facts in a criminal case, and where
the testimony is such that reasonable minds may believe that the charge
alleged in the information has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
the verdict of the jury is conclusive as to the sufficiency of the evidence and
the action of the trial court in denying a new trial based upon the insufficiency of the evidence will not be disturbed.
.That when a statement in the nature of a complaint is made immediately following the commission of the crime of rape, and after the particular
testimony of the prosecutrix has been attacked or her credibility questioned
by the defense, the state may prove the particulars of such statement, either
by her, or by the person -to whom such statement was made. State v.
Wener, 16 N.D. 83,112 N.W. 60 followed and approved. Appeal from the
District Court of Forster County, McFarland, J. AFFIRMED. Opinion
of -the court by Burr, J., Nuessle, J. dissenting.

